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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CLEO R. POWELL, ] 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ] 
vs. ] 
DICK E. BASTIAN, DEE V. SHARP, 
dba SHARP REALTY, and Provo 
Branch PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS " 
§ LOAN ASSOCIATION, a Federally 
Chartered Savings and Loan ' 
Association, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
) Case No. 139. 
APPELLANTS BRIEF 
NATURE OF CASE 
This action in equity and law is brought on 
appeal from the Fourth District Court for Utah 
County by the plaintiff-appellant, Mrs. Cleo R. 
Powell, formerly a resident and for seventeen years 
purchaser of a home in Orem, Utah. The Amended 
Complaint alleges the plaintiff suffered equitable 
and legal damages in a transaction involving the 
sale of her Orem home. The trial without a jury 
was held in October, 1974, presided over by the Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Honorable J. Robert Bullock, District Judge. 
The Amended Complaint was filed on the 9th 
day of August, 1973, showing Cleo R. Powell and 
Stephen R. Smoot, her Trustee in Bankruptcy, as 
plaintiffs. The Trustee was included as a 
plaintiff because in the summer of 1972 Mrs. 
Powell, having been deprived of her fair share 
of the sale price of her Orem home, was forced 
into bankruptcy for the discharge of approximately 
$3,000.00 of judgments and other unsecured debts. 
The contingency claim, represented by this case, 
was revealed in the bankruptcy schedules. The 
Trustee in Bankruptcy elected to join as a 
plaintiff in the trial because of his interest 
in maximization of Mrs. Powell's bankruptcy estate, 
but said Trustee in Bankruptcy declined to join 
in this appeal. 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court issued its pretrial Order on 
September 6, 1974, (R 85) and by the same instrument 
disposed of.pretrial motions as follows: 
(a) Plaintiff's Motion (R 50), that the court 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
hold, as a matter of law, that the deed of plain-
tiff's home to defendant Bastian together with 
Bastian's option to plaintiff to sell or buy 
back the home within three months at an increased 
price of $2,000.00 constituted a security arrange-
ment rather than a bona fide sale was denied (R 85). 
(b) Plaintiff's Motion (R 80), to hold 
defendant Bastian responsible to pay seller's 
costs in the real estate closing was denied (R 85). 
(c) Plaintiff's Motion (R 82), to require 
defendant Sharp to make restitution to Mrs. Powell 
of $1,230.00 real estate commission was denied (R 85). 
(d) Plaintiff's Motion (R 46), to strike 
paragraph 5 of defendant Prudential Federal Savings 
§ Loan Association's answer was denied (R 85). 
(e) Defendant Prudential's Motions (R 26 § 59), 
to dismiss the case as to it was granted (R 84 § 91). 
(f) Defendant Dee V. Sharp's Motion (R 24 § 52), 
for summary judgment was denied (R 61 § 85). 
(g) The trial court ruled (R 86) as a matter 
of law that there could be no general, or exemplary 
damages which had been claimed in the Amended 
Comolaint fR 691. 
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(h) The case was set for a non-jury trial on 
October 3, 1974. 
THE FACTS OF THE CASE 
The facts are set forth in the Amended Complaint 
(R63) and are substantially the same as the facts 
found in the trial court's findings of fact (R 101), 
and are as summarized below. 
In June, 1970, plaintiff-appellant, Cleo R. 
Powell (hereinafter called tfMrs. Powell") had been 
faced with foreclosure of mortgages on her home 
which a year previously had been appraised at 
$24,500.00. She sought a loan from defendant-
respondent Dick E. Bastian (hereinafter called 
MBastiann) to stave off the impending foreclosures. 
Instead of lending money, Bastian purchased the 
home for $16,000.00 by deed (R 70) and he simultaneously 
gave Mrs. Powell a written option (R 73) to buy the 
home back or sell it and pay him $18,000.00 within 
three months. 
During the three-month option period, in order 
to preserve as much of her equity as possible, Mrs. 
Powell listed the home for quick sale at $21,500.00 
on the Utah County Multiple Listing Program through 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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a neighbor who worked for Boles , n real estate 
broker of American I ;ork, 1 It 
later, defendant-respondent iJtt v. Sharp (herein-
after called "Sharp"), al so a ] :i censed real 
estate broker, asked Mi s, Powell ] i:c: • s i gi 1 an 
Earnest Money Agreement to sell the home to third 
parties fc r $20,500.00, or $1, 11)0,00 less than the 
listing. Since time was running short for Mrs, 
Powell to recover anything from her home, i n 
despera/ti on she si gned tl le Agreement arid ad v i sed 
broker Sharp that Bastian's signature would also 
be necessary since she had deeded the property 
to 1 lirn and had no I: exercised hei opti oi I to 
repurchase the property. 
Shortly after execution of the Earnest Money 
Agreement on September in, iJ.u, n L1O± nig oi the 
sale, of 'which Mrs, Powell was not notified, was 
arranged a 1: the offices of defendant-respondent 
Prudential Federal Savings § I oan Associate on, 
Provo Branch (hereinafter called "'Prudential " ) . 
Wi thout making i nqt li xy of Mi s I >OIA1 e ] 1 , ai id oi l Basti an1: 
advice,, Prudential's closing agent, Mark Radmall, 
charged all sales costs, including $1,230.00 real 
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es ta t e commission against Mrs. Powell'? equity. 
The s-ilo p :v - ' • , - . . •: •;"'.'{ " *>• . 
Powell 's equity, wore forthwith d i s t r i b u t e 
Prudential in accordance with the s e l l e r f s 
statement prepared b> Prudentj a] '"""s agent Mark 
Radmall (R 74), which statement was changed l a t e r 
by Mark Radmall, also on Bastiaii 's advice, by 
forcing a balance, i low cliai gii ig $36- LOO a< Idl/ti onal 
" i n t e r e s t " to Mrs, Powell as shown in Mark Radmallfs 
'l\\t\vr (1 ' I I . 
Fol]Oi Pig the t r i a l , tlio cour t ' s dec roc II! II"! I 
ordered jvu wment entered for Mis, Powell against 
)Vi:.tLin is f|,ie anIOi nt sf $347.V> t*tr t i t l e 
insurance I of $119.00) and t<txos (of $228.53) 
improperly charged to Mrs, Powell's equity by 
P.udeiitial at llii i iusiii)j «ni adi n e uf Bsst iaii. 
No other r e l i e f prayed for by the p la in t i f f 
\vrf-; granted by the t r i a l court. 
KliUbr SUIHII'I UN MVl Ah 
Since th i s h a case m equity, and pa r t i cu la r ly 
since there i s si ibstanti a] ] ) no d:i spi ite among the 
pa r t i e s as to the facts (though there i s substaiiti a] 
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disagreement as to the law and how the law should 
be appli ed to these fa cts), th:i s coi xrt :i s free on 
this appeal to consider this enti re case in all 
its aspects, including special damages of $4,342,50 
in addition to $.'A\\?,'S rpei la! iLimap.es .iwardnl by 
the trial court. In addition, !•••-?. Towell prays 
for general damages in the amount of $4,000,00 
and exemplary damages also i n 1 .^^ ; I: of $< 1,000 (3(3, 
to be allocated among the defendants-respondents 
as i ii the wl se d:i screti on of tliii s coi irt seems just. 
The damages thus prayed for are comparable to 1:1 le 
treble damages commonly awarded by statute in 
comparable -cases, 
I 
TIE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS REFUSAL TO 
GRANT PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO FIND AS A 
MATTER OF LAW THAT MRS. POWELL'S DEED OF 
HER HOME TO DEFENDANT RASTIAN FOR $16,000.00 
TOGETHER WITH BASTIANfS ABSOLUTE OPTION TO 
MRS. POWELL TO SELL TO A THIRD PERSON OR 
REPURCHASE WITHIN THREE MONTHS FOR $18,000.00 
CONSTITUTED A SECURITY AGREEMENT, NOT A BONA 
FIDE SALE AND PURCHASE. 
The central issue in this case :i n i tis factual 
context i s wliether or not the deed to Mrs. Powell fs 
home gi v ei l to Basti ai l :: i i Ji u le J! "/ ] 970, • Ii: :)i $] 6,000 00, Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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aiid Bastianfs simultaneous giving of the option 
to Mt*i Powell to sell flif honn Hi1 rrpitiehasr it 
within three months for $18,000.00, constituted a 
bona fide purchase and sale of real property as 
claimed hy Hhe deJ'ondants-respondents,, i 
constituted a mortgage security agreement as 
claimed bv plaintiff-appellant, Mrs. Powell. The 
trial court refused to iuul the transaction ' •. 
a security agreement and denied plaintiff's Motion 
(V 'iHi llui! flu 11ansae! Mil slmmiM IK declared sinh, 
The trial eourt thus lefused to follow this 
court in ;;uoh Utah eases as Gibbons v s . Gibbons, 
i,V) r.^J Itil), jue Q'Mh) where this court points 
out in dicta that a deed may constitute a mortgage 
when the following facts exist: 
I I Tie deed .is given in ..itisfaet ion ml 
preexistent debt; 
2 The grantor i s entitled to remain i n 
possession without payment of rent; 
3. The * rare or is ol ligti. t* IMV taxes; 
I T! le . > . . * \ ' 
property after execute <i • « u,t u« eu. 
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Mrs. Powell remained in possession of the house 
without any obi igati on to pay rent to Bastian. 
Indeed all of the foregoing conditions existed 
in tlii s transaction. ' 
M C A * leciutl), thr litnJi Siipiviw* Coin I ni Kjar 
vs. Brimley, 27 IJ.2d 410, 497 P.2d 25 (197ZJ found 
that th'Utfh the plaintiffs executed a warranty deed 
to 1 he defendants, tl le transact:] on was a sea II :i ty 
agreement and not a sale. At. 497 P.2d 23, 25 this 
court s I ates: 
"The law may imply a promise to repay a debt 
im3eFpaHicurar^circxjmstances of any case"7" 
where it is clear that the lender had relied 
on the property for his security, being 
satisfied that he is protected by its high 
value in relation to the amount loaned.f! 
[Emphasis addedI. 
The principal of law involved here is also 
stated by tl i:i s coi u t i n Bybee_ysil_Stuai it, ] 89 P.2d 
118 (1948) where at page 122 the following will be 
found: 
11
 It is true, of course, that a warranty deed, 
absolute in foxm is presumed to convey a fee 
simple title, or at least whatever title the 
grantor has. But where, as here, there is a 
written agreement between the parties, 
contemporaneous with the deed, which shows 
the deed to have been given for security 
purposes, the court will look to the real Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clar  Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
transaction, and treat it as a mortgage. 
T^QTO"vsT~SKeen, 89 Utah 568, 58 P.2d 24. 
TEe fact that by the terms of the contract, 
Oni Stuart had the right to sell the land"" 
to" a third person, clearly indicates the 
intention of the parties that title should 
not passjbo the defendant/1 [Emphasis added]. 
In Khar vs. Brimley and Byvje Vb. .-cuctrt, 
this o; irt ssid t!-r retention . t 1 V> rl;_M
 r the 
j-,'t^' V ^ ?{ ' *•-= tr; M * b «<••?**• f • t l i i w 
person i -Hi) indicates the intention or tne 
parties tut f i' !•• should not pass to the defendant. 
r
 > * ' * •> 
of t V pa r t i e s tha t t i t l .* suoui.. hot pa?^ to bastian 
s ince , a f ter i : \ i n r 1 ' , , t ^~-» * s-- Powell remained 
in possession cj<u :nnae.;:.•. < i : -, < ; , •;;*/ 
IV r :^ilo n t h a r 1 ; c 4 itc broker and *;<? property 
*
v
' ..: * ' J • •!" .:, ITiis showc 
both >': >. i owl i • • .. riastian intended 
given V v^s. r \x !1 t:< Bastian would - <t convey 
h t l e t<) HistKIII, ' "i1 <i'i' Mil1 option would preserve 
t i t l e in Mrs. Powell so slit could se l l fJie house 
within three months for enough to pay Bastian1s 
•1>J,( ui),mi 'JU-duy "profi r , f. 
The defendants clearly misconstrued the law 
/^ •^ f l i i p r ^ i n - F ir\A morlA mi H 4l H-f 1 1 tA 17 " flrOlltTlfirit b e f o r e 
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the trial court of the fact that in Mrs. Powell's 
deposition she did not deny that she ffintended'f to 
sign a deed to the property. It should be obvious 
that Mrs. Powell did sign the deed and for her to 
deny that she had signed would be out-and-out 
falsehood. 
Where the defendants erred, the trial court 
erred in adopting defendants1 argument is that 
under the circumstances of this case, the Utah 
courts have universally found that though a 
plaintiff did not deny signing away his property, 
when the grantee simultaneously gave a defeasance 
of his title, the courts made the necessary inference 
that the plaintiff did not intend to sign away title 
to the property, and the defeasance of title showed 
the grantee did not intend to take title. 
II 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE HELD DEFENDANT 
BASTIAN RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL SALES COSTS 
SINCE (1) HE WAS PRESENT AT THE CLOSING; 
(2) SIGNED THE CLOSING PAPERS AS SELLER; 
(3) DEEDED THE PROPERTY DIRECTLY TO THE 
THIRD PARTY PURCHASER; (4) ASSUMED ALL 
SAI.ES EXPENSES BY THE TERMS OF HIS OPTION 
AGREEMENT TO CONVEY ,fFREE AND CLEAR1 f OF 
ALL ENCUMBRANCES 
A-Fi-<vr ^ Ac-Han had Q-i cmed the Earnest Monev 
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Receipt submitted by Sharp, Bastian was notified 
of and attended the real estate closing conducted 
by Prudential's loan officer, Mark Radmall, at 
its Provo Office. Mrs. Powell was not notified 
of the closing and consequently did not attend. 
Though Mrs. Powell was not present, through 
collusion between Prudential's closing officer 
Radmall, and Bastian, all of the closing costs 
were charged against Mrs. Powell's equity. 
In order to call the trial court's attention 
to this particular oddity in the closing proceedings, 
Mrs. Powell brought a Motion to Strike Paragraph 
5 of Prudential's Answer to the Amended Complaint 
(R 46) in which paragraph Prudential asserted it 
had assessed all seller's costs against "the seller 
Bastian". Actually it was not clear from the 
seller's statement (R 74) prepared by Radmall and 
signed by Bastian as seller on September 10, 1970, 
who had actually paid the "seller's costs" including 
taxes, title insurance, recording, real estate 
commission, because there was no accounting to 
show how Mrs. Powell's "equity" of $247.26 had 
U*mm n v r i v a / 1 «a + Mr»t I T T l t l l TTiflTIV TrUTntliq 1 flt.&T W h e n 
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Mrs. Powell!s counsel demanded and received a 
letter from Prudential's agent Mark Radmall dated 
March 24, 1972 (R 74) was it perfectly clear that 
nseller Bastian" had not paid the seller's expenses, 
but rather that lfseller's costs" had been charged 
to the absent Mrs. Powell's "equity". 
Yet all Prudential's false assertions in this 
case that Bastian had been charged seller's costs 
have been made many months after Prudential's 
admissions in Radmall's letter (R 74). 
In addition to attending the closing, Mr. 
Bastian and his wife, Jessie Bastian, herself a 
licensed real estate agent, signed the seller's 
statement and the deed conveying title to Mrs. 
Powell's home to the third party buyers, the 
Ethingtons. Mrs. Powell never performed any act 
as a seller except to sign the Earnest Money 
Receipt, which Bastian also signed. Additionally, 
Mr. and Mrs. Bastian signed the option in which 
the Bastians explicitely promised to pay for title 
insurance and to deliver marketable title from 
themselves "free and clear of all encumbrances 
excent those herein mentioned". The Dortion of the 
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option fomi denominated "encumbrances" is filled 
out with the following words, "All encumbrances 
will be paid at this time [of reconveyance] or 
the optionee has the right to assume the present 
loan with Walker Bank, Provo, Utah, as part of 
the purchase price." 
Despite the foregoing, on advice of Bastian, 
Prudential charged all the usual seller's costs 
to Mrs. Powell, then repeatedly and doggedly, 
throughout the pretrial period, Prudential insisted 
(a) in its Answer to the Amended Complaint (R 46), 
(b) Answer to Interrogatories (R 39), and (c) Memo-
randum in Opposition to Strike Paragraph 5 of its 
Answer, that Bastian was the seller but Prudential 
never explained why, if Bastian was the seller, 
seller's costs were charged to Mrs. Powell, a stranger 
to the closing. 
Ill 
DEFENDANT SHARP SHOULD HAVE BEEN REQUIRED 
TO MAKE RESTITUTION OF HIS SALES COMMISSION 
TO MRS. POWELL FOR HIS FAILURE TO FULFILL 
HIS FIDUCIARY DUTIES TO HER 
The reasons that the trial court should have 
granted Mrs. Powell's Motion to require defendant 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Sharp to make restitution to Mrs. Powell of the 
$1,230.00 which was given to him by Prudential 
from Mrs. Powell's funds at the real estate 
closing are set forth in plaintiff's Memorandum 
(R 82). The arguments are summarized here. 
Mrs. Powell alleged in her verified Complaint, 
and the trial court found as fact (R 104) that 
defendant Sharp was employed by Mrs. Powell as 
her agent and the court found that Sharp owed her 
a fiduciary duty. This finding places this aspect 
of this case on all fours with Reese vs. Harper, 
8 U.2d 119, 329 P.2d 410 (1958) wherein this court 
found that: 
"It is incumbent upon [a real estate broker] 
to apply his abilities and knowledge to the 
advantage of the man he served; and to make 
full disclosure of the fact which his principal 
should know in transacting the business. 
Failure to discharge such duty with reasonable 
Hlligence^Jid care precludes his recovery f o ~ 
the services Tie purports to be rendering. 
[Emphasis added]. 
With the trial court's finding that Sharp was 
Mrs. Powell's agent and owed her a fiduciary duty, 
the specific remedy in Reese vs. Harper, which 
found that failure lfto discharge duty with Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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reasonable diligence1 f precluded broker Reese 
from recovering for the services he purported 
to perform, is the specific remedy "which should 
be invoked here. In case there be some thought 
that Broker Sharp fulfilled his fiduciary duty 
to Mrs. Powell, the court should read Sharp's 
Affidavit (R 56) signed by Sharp and filed with 
the court wherein paragraph 5, Sharp states: 
11
. . . The undersigned had no responsibility 
nor any opportunity for preparation of 
closing documents, and specifically denies 
any collusion or even knowledge on the part 
of the undersigned as to the disposition of 
the funds disbursed by the closing agent . . . 
that he was uninformed as to the distribution 
of funds between Bastian and Powell." 
ff6. The undersigned denies any responsibility 
to act as a fiscal agent for Mrs. Powell . . ." 
Mrs. Powell alleges in paragraph 11 of the 
Amended Complaint (R 67) that defendant Sharp 
failed to perform his duty to her (a) by failing 
to notify her of the time and the place of the 
closing, (b) by failure to examine and approve 
(as required by his license) the closing statement, 
and (c) by permitting unlawful charges against 
Mrs. Powell's equity. 
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Mrs. Powell urges this court to consider the 
additional fact that the Department of Business 
Regulation, Real Estate Division, Rules and 
Regulations, published by the department, speci-
fically require a real estate broker to attend a 
closing and state: 
"When sales are closed in title insurance 
offices, lending institutions, and other 
broker's offices, the broker or his 
representative shall attend said closing, 
approve all closing statements." [Emphasis 
addec[J7 
By his own sworn statement, Sharp failed to 
fulfill the duty to review or even become aware 
of the contents of the closing papers, as 
specifically imposed upon him by regulatory law. 
This court should, as a minimum, require defendant 
Sharp to return the $1,230.00 real estate commission 
he received directly from Prudential's loan officer 
Radmall from Mrs. Powell's equity in her home. 
Otherwise, real estate brokers in Utah are likely 
in the future to disregard regulatory law and to 
take their fees without even being aware that the 
law imposes upon them any duty, or to wham the 
duty is owed. Sharp cannot say this is a case Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
where the parties were equally knowledgeable 
of their rights under the law and that his duty 
was limited to bringing buyer and seller together. 
This is a case where Mrs. Powell's funds paid 
his fee and she, being absent from the closing, 
was in desperate need of his professional 
knowledge and protection. 
IV 
THE PRETRIAL DISMISSAL BY TOE TRIAL COURT 
OF PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS $ LOAN 
ASSOCIATION WAS ERROR AND SHOULD BE 
REVERSED 
It appears that the trial court accepted the 
arguments of Prudential that it owed no fiduciary 
duty to Mrs. Powell on the ground that Mrs. Powell 
had no contact with Prudential prior to the real 
estate closing. Prudential went further and argued 
to the trial court that it had absolutely no duty 
of any kind to Mrs. Powell, apparently not even 
the T!prudent manM duty of ordinary care, despite 
the fact that in the closing Prudential disbursed 
$4,338.48 of Mrs. Powell's funds without her 
knowledge or consent. At least part of those 
disbursements were held by the trial court to have 
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been unlawful. 
If the inconsistency of Prudential's asserting 
absolutely no duty to the owner of property whose 
funds it disbursed was insufficient to require 
Prudential to stand trial, the other inconsistencies 
in its pleadings should have been, e.g. the claim 
made in Prudential's Answer that Bastian was the 
"seller" of the property, but without any 
explanation why, if Bastian was the seller, the 
seller's costs were not charged to Bastian rather 
than to an absent third party, Mrs. Powell. 
Prudential repeatedly asserted in its pleadings 
and Answer to Interrogatories that Prudential 
received all of its information from Bastian which 
resulted in damage to Mrs. Powell, but ridicules 
the thought that Prudential was in any way a party 
to a conspiracy against the interests of Mrs. 
Powell. Is conspiracy something other than two 
people agreeing to a plan that is detrimental to 
a third party? 
Also, Prudential has made no answer to the 
allegation contained in paragraph 13 of the Amended 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
that Prudential's loan officer Radmall "forced11 
a balance in his letter of March 24, 1972 (R 76) 
by charging plaintiff Powell's account with $364.00 
in addition to any figure shown on the official 
seller's closing statement he had prepared on 
September 10, 1970 (R 74). Yet both the letter 
and the seller's closing statement begin and end 
with the same opening and closing figures. It is 
difficult to see how Prudential could claim no 
responsibility for at least ordinary negligence 
in "forcing11 these documents to balance. 
It must also be remembered that Prudential's 
loan officer Radmall understood that Mrs. Powell 
had an "equity11 or ownership in the property. 
Wouldn't the pursuit of just ordinary care require 
him to have made inquiry of Mrs. Powell or to have 
examined the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to 
Purchase and the option so that in pursuance of 
ordinary care he could have made his own calculations 
without collusion with Bastian and avoided damaging 
Mrs. Powell? 
Mrs. Powell argues that Prudential owed her a 
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duty under the definition of "fiduciary" given 
in a dictum by this court in Bradbury vs. Rassmussen, 
16 U.2d 378, 401 P.2d 710 (1965), which states that 
a fiduciary relationship arises when one person 
places confidence in another "under such circum-
stances as to create a corresponding duty, either 
legal or moral, on the part of the other to 
observe the confidence . . , and it must result 
in a situation where as a matter of fact there is 
superior influence on one side and dependence on 
the other". Such a situation is surely obtained 
here. 
However, if a standard of only ordinary care 
was required of Prudential without privity with 
Mrs. Powell to protect her from damage, it would 
be no greater standard than that set by Title 12, 
Sec. 1464, United States Code, governing federally 
chartered savings and loan associations, which 
states that federal charters should be issued only 
to associations giving "primary consideration to 
the best practices of local mutual thrift and 
home lending institutions in the United States. " 
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Such a standard of care would be similar to 
that set in Milliner vs. Elmer Fox Co., 529 P.2d 
806, decided by this court on December 10, 1974, 
and may more accurately describe the standard of 
care on which Mrs. Powell relies in making her 
claim against Prudential. In Milliner, the court 
dealt specifically with the question of liability 
of accountants to a third party for their negligence, 
despite the absence of privity between the third 
party and the accountants when the accountants had 
reason to know that such party would rely on the 
accountant's report for a particular purpose. 
The opinion of this court goes on to state: 
MWe are of the opinion that the lack of 
privity is not a defense where an accountant 
who is aware of the fact that his work will 
be relied on by a party or parties who may 
extend credit to his client or assume his 
client's obiigations.ff 
If an accountant is held responsible to third 
parties without privity with those third parties, 
should the law permit a large organization such 
as Prudential to escape liability for negligent 
damage it caused to Mrs. Powell, just because she 
had no privity with the institution? This question Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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was also dealt with in Shatterproof Glass vs. 
James, by the Texas Civil Court of Appeals, 466 
SW.2d, page 73, 46 ALR 3rd 964, (1971) which case 
was cited with approval by this court in Milliner, 
supra. 
In Shatterproof, the Texas Court of Civil 
Appeals adopted as the law in Texas, the definition 
of the Restatement (2d) of Torts, Sec. 552, as 
follows: 
11
 (1) One who, in the course of his business, 
profession or employment, or in a transaction 
in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies 
false information for the guidance of others 
in their business transactions, is subject to 
liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by 
their justifiable reliance upon the information, 
if he fails to exercise reasonable care or 
competence in obtaining or communicating the 
information^1 [Emphasis added]. 
It would be completely reasonable for this 
court to hold Prudential to the standard of the 
restatement quoted above and adopted as law in 
Texas. The plaintiff in Shatterproof at least 
had the option to decide whether or not to rely 
on the accountant's opinion. Mrs. Powell had no 
such option. She was deprived of her property by 
the actions of Prudential in her absence and without Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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her consent. It was inconsistent with the facts 
as revealed in the pleadings and law of this case 
for the trial court to dismiss Prudential before 
the plaintiff had an opportunity in open court to 
ask Prudential's agents under oath to explain the 
many inconsistencies raised by Prudential's pleadings 
but explained by Prudential, only by alleging 
repeatedly that it obtained all its information 
from Bastian who obviously stood to gain if his 
advice was followed. This was not the exercise of 
reasonable care in obtaining itsinformation. 
V 
ALL PROCEEDS REALIZED BY DEFENDANT BASTIAN 
FROM THE TRANSACTION CONSTITUTE INTEREST ON 
MONEY ADVANCED AND NOT PROFIT, AND ALL SUCH 
FINANCIAL REALIZATIONS IN EXCESS OF 81 
ANNUALIZED CONSTITUTE ILLEGAL INTEREST 
The only funds advanced by Bastian on which 
he is entitled to receive interest is $8,703.35 
he paid out on June 12, 1970, and on which he is 
entitled to 81 interest for 90 days, or $171.68. 
All other proceeds realized by Bastian from the 
transaction in excess of the actual funds advanced 
constitute usurious interest. An annotation at Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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59 ALR 2d 522 sets forth the legal theory on 
which plaintiff sought relief in the trial and 
on which appellant relies here. At 59 ALR 2d 
526, the annotation states: 
11
. . .an action at common law in the 
nature of an action for money had and 
received will lie for the recovery back 
of the usurious payments, at least where 
the statute in relation to usury declares 
a usurious contract void in whole or in 
part.n 
Since July 1, 1969 (approximately 9 months 
before the beginning of the transaction here under 
consideration), interest rates and penalties for 
usuary have been set forth in Title 70B, U.C.A., 
The Utah Unifoim Consumer Credit Code (hereinafter 
"UUCCC"). Therefore, whether Utah law "declares 
usurious contracts void in whole or in part,n 
must be determined by that statute. 
Reference is made to "debtors remedies1 f as 
set forth in Section 70B-5-201, which in turn 
makes reference to Section 70B-5-204, providing 
that if a consumer loan involves an interest in 
land, the borrower (Mrs. Powell) shall have three 
^
ay s to rescind [void] the contract following 
rioi-iir^ -rv tn hftr of the disclosure required by the 
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act regarding, among other facts, the annual rate 
of interest the lender is charging for the loan. 
Defendant Bastian did not at the time of the 
loan, and has never since the transaction, made 
the required disclosures to Mrs. Powell. It is 
at least arguable that she still has the right 
to rescind. If she does rescind, subsection (2) 
of Section 70B-5-204 becomes effective and Mrs. 
Powell could demand return to her of her home 
plus interest and service charges made against 
her. 
Since such rescision would cause great damage 
to the purchasers of her home who are presumed to 
be entirely innocent of any wrongdoing, Mrs. Powell, 
so far, has elected not to rescind, but rather to 
seek damages she has suffered against those whose 
actions caused her damage and who are knowledgeable 
and responsible for her damages, viz., the defendants 
herein. 
Though the plaintiffs elected to bring this 
action on common law and equitable theories as 
exemplified by the 59 ALR 2d 526 annotation and 
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might question whether the statutory remedies 
set forth in Title 70B, the UUCCC are exclusive 
so as to preclude any claim of usuary under common 
law outside the perimeters of the statute. This 
question seems to have been answered by the Legis-
lature itself. One of several references to the 
statute's non-exclusivity reads as follows: 
"70B-1-103. Supplementary general principles 
of law applicable. - Unless displaced by the 
particular provisions of this act, the Uniform 
Commercial Code and the principles of law and 
equity, including the law relative to capacity 
to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, 
fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, 
mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating 
or invalidating cause shall supplement its pro-
visions.11 
Mrs. Powell contends that she retains her 
common law right to recover usurious interest 
and that the legal rate applicable to this trans-
action is 8% as established by the option, the 
only instrument signed by the parties. Or if for 
some reason the court feels the rate of 10% per 
annum should be used, which rate was used by 
the Legislature as the maximum interest rate 
which, if not exceeded, appears to relieve a lender 
of money secured by an interest in land from some Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of the UUCCC sanctions other than the requirement 
of disclosure. The change in calculations using 
101 would not be difficult nor change the amount 
of damage significantly. 
The Section containing the 10% figure reads: 
"70B-105. Definition - 'Loan primarily 
secured by an interest in land/. Unless 
the loan is made subj ect to this act by 
agreement (Section 70B-3-601), and except 
as provided with respect to disclosure 
(Section 70B-3-301) and debtor's remedies 
(Section 70B-5-201), 'consumer loan' does 
not include a 'loan primarily secured by 
an interest in land,' if at the time the 
loan is made the value of this collateral 
is substantial in relation to the amount 
of the loan, and the loan finance charge 
does not exceed ten per cent per year 
calculated according to the actuarial method 
of the unpaid balances of the principal on 
the assumption that the debt will be paid 
according to the agreed terms and will not 
be paid before the end of the agreed term. 
Nothing herein will prevent the acceleration 
of payment without penalty. [Emphasis added]. 
On June 17, 1970, Bastian paid $3,055.34 cash 
to Mrs. Powell (which she promptly used to pay 
pressing debts and to improve her Orem home); $103.00 
to Security Title and $5,545.01 to pay off second 
mortgagee Lockhart. That was the total of $8,703.35 
advanced, and is the total upon which Bastian is 
-28-
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entitled to receive 8% legal interest for 90 days 
until the sale was closed. Interest amounts to 
$1.90 per day or $171.68 for 90 days, which, if 
added to the $8,703.35 advanced, totals $8,875.03 
for cash advanced with permissible interest. 
The figures of the transaction are summarized 
below: 
PROCEEDS DISBURSED BY PRUDENTIAL FROM 
THE SALE $20,570.00 
Cash advanced by Bastian June 17, 1970, 
on which 8% interest is due for 90 days: 
Cash to Mrs. Powell $3,055.43 
To title insurance 103.00 
2nd mortgage 5,545.01 
Interest at 8% for 90 days 171.68 
TOTAL ADVANCED BY BASTIAN AND INTEREST 
DUE THEREON 8,875.03 
Cash disbursed by Prudential to Mrs. 
Powell or for her benefit: 
Cash for her "equity" $ 247.26 
Judgments and tax liens 375.41 
Retirement of Walker 
mortgage 6,783.12 
TOTAL DISBURSED BY PRUDENTIAL FOR MRS. POWELL 
7,403.64 
Combined disbursements by Bastian 
and Prudential 16,278.67 
Illegal interest "profit" and selling 
costs charged to Mrs. Powell 4,291.33 
$ 20,570.00 
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The illegal interest, "profit11 and selling 
costs in the amount of $4,291.33 shown above 
constitute a substantial part of Mrs. Powell's 
special damages. 
Mrs. Powell also claims that Bastian took 
credit for paying her $16,000.00 for the option 
whereas the pay-off of Walker Bank's first 
mortgage was $513.53 less than he took credit 
for in accounting for the $16,000.00. Also, 
following the court's ruling that no general 
or special damages could be assessed, the court 
by verbal order allowed Mrs. Powell to amend her 
pleadings to include as an item of special damages, 
$400.00 which her bankruptcy had cost for filing 
fees and attorney's fees. And Mrs. Powell 
calculates her damages in the following schedule 
showing as offsets to her claimed damages, the 
$171.00 lawful interest to which Bastian was 
entitled and the $347.33 damages awarded Mrs. 
Powell by the trial court. 
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Total special damages claimed are: 
Seller's costs assessed by 
Prudential $1,947.30 
Claimed but unpaid by Bastian 
to Mrs. Powell 513.53 
Illegal interest claimed as 
"profit" 2,000.00 
Damages claimed in Amended 
Complaint $4,460.83 
Bankruptcy filing and attorney's 
fees 400.00 
Total special damages $4,860.83 
Less 81 interest on $8,703.35 
for 90 days due Bastian 171.68 
$4,689.15 
Less damages awarded by trial 
court 347.33-
NET SPECIAL DAMAGES NOW CLAIMED 
BY MRS. POWELL $4,341.82 
VI 
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT GENERAL AND 
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES CANNOT BE ASSESSED IN 
THIS CASE WAS ERRONEOUS AND THIS COURT 
SHOULD NOW ASSESS SUCH DAMAGES AGAINST ALL 
OR SOME OF THE DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR DEGREE OF FAULT IN 
CAUSING MRS. POWELL'S DAMAGES 
It is Mrs. Powell's position that in the context 
of this case and following the ideology set forth 
in the annotation at 20 ALR 3d 666, the trial court 
was free to allocate, and this court is now free 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to assess special, general and exemplary damages 
in relation to the degree of fault each defendant 
caused to the plaintiff. 
That the foregoing is true in Utah seems 
to have been spelled out by the Legislature when 
it passed statutory provision for settlement by 
joint tort-feasors, as follows: 
n78-27-40. Settlement by joint tort-feasor -
Determination of relative degrees of fault""" 
oFJoint tort-feasors" - Joint tort-feasor 
HeTified, . . 
[2JlVhen there is a disproportion of fault 
among joint tort-feasors to an extent that it 
would render inequitable an equal distribution 
by contribution among them of their common 
liability, the relative degrees of fault of 
the joint tort-feasors shall be considered in 
determining their prorata shares, solely for 
the purpose of determining their rights of 
contribution among themselves, each remaining 
severally liable to the injured person for 
the whole injury as at common law." 
Also, reference is made to plaintiff's Motion 
for amendment of the pretrial Order, (R 87), which 
cites the statement of Chief Justice Warren E. 
Burger, made when he was still a member of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Washington, 
D.C. Circuit, in Brown vs. Coats 253 F.2d 36, 67 
ALR 2d 943 (1958), which is a case strikingly 
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similar to this case on questions of law. Circuit 
Judge Burger, in justifying the imposition of 
punitive damages said at page 950-51 in 67 ALR 2d: 
"When one is commissioned by, or holds 
himself out to, the community to perform 
special services which may be engaged for 
hire by others in the conduct of their 
personal or business affairs, such as 
lawyers, trust companies, realtors, or the 
like, sudTpersons inescapably assume certain 
fiduciary responsibilities. The community 
in turn has a broad public interest, as a 
matter of public policy, in how such persons 
conduct their relations with those who place 
trust in them . . . " [Emphasis added] 
Mrs, Powell realizes damages cannot be charged 
twice, and if this court requires Sharp to make 
restitution of his commission, that amount must be 
deducted from the special damages claimed against 
Bastian. Mrs. Powell suffered great humiliation 
and mental pain by being forced into bankruptcy, for 
which she seeks $4,000.00 general damages. She also 
asks $4,000.00 exemplary damages. If these special, 
general and exemplary damages are granted, it would 
amount to about the "treble damages" Legislatures 
commonly allow for usuary. 
Mrs. Powell realizes that defendant Bastian 
stood to gain the most from the improprieties of 
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also the other defendants as well. The outrageous -
ness of the entire transaction is such that some 
of the general or exemplary damages should be 
assessed against Prudential since in its position 
of trust, Prudential cannot excuse itself from 
the negligent damage it caused Mrs. Powell. The 
matter of damages, of course, is left to the wise 
and equitable discretion of this court. 
CONCLUSION 
This case arises in factual context where a 
woman who worked as a retail clerk at low wages 
with modest help from her foimer husband in the 
form of child support, supported her two daughters 
and one son, educating them, and for 17 years 
keeping up the payments on her home. Finally, 
family circumstances intervened over which she 
had no control and she was forced to become 
delinquent in her house payments and to borrow 
against her equity from a second mortgage. In 
desperation she agreed to sell her house for a 
fraction of its value to a party she sought out 
for a provident loan. The buyer, realizing that Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the house had value much in excess of what he 
paid, agreed to sell the house back to her for 
a $2,000.00 quick profit if she could raise the 
money he advanced plus $2,000,00 by selling it 
to a third party within three months. 
Once she had signed an Earnest Money Offer 
presented by a licensed real estate broker, she 
never heard anything about the transaction until 
after the closing had been held at Prudential and 
a check was issued to her for about 10% of the 
amount she expected to receive from the transaction. 
All of her equity and all of her bargaining power 
had disappeared. She didn't owe anyone anything 
in the transaction from whom she could withhold 
payments. She was simply deprived of the equity 
in her home she had built up over 17 years and 
had almost nothing to show for it. 
Since the days of the first English Chancellors, 
courts have fashioned and employed equitable 
remedies and at least in more recent years, courts 
have expressed their moral indignation by assessing 
exemplary damages against those responsible. The 
QTm^lla-nt -PPP1C tVii Q i c the IHnrl n f ra^e where 
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exemplary damages should be assessed to warn 
others they act at their peril if they take too 
lightly their responsibility to be fair to poor 
and powerless parties whose funds they are 
disbursing. 
Respectfully submitted, 
7 
4t& stBTCT Stewart 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
425 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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